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FEATURE
The Historical Presidency
“No Man Is Big Enough”: President Harding's 
Defense of the Proto-Modern Executive
NIALL PALMER
Warren Harding's administration was not, as is widely perceived, a failed experiment in executive 
whiggism but a surprisingly spirited defense of presidential authority against the strongest anti-executive 
backlash since Reconstruction. His support for active-interventionist conservatism and a modified style of 
“steward” leadership separated him from his traditionalist Republican predecessors—William McKinley and 
William H. Taft—and successor—Calvin Coolidge. Ambitiously, Harding sought to fuse elements of the 
Roosevelt–Wilson experiments in presidential leadership with his own, less egocentric view of “balanced” 
constitutional government. His adaptability helped maintain the expansion of the administrative state and 
of the “institutional” and “rhetorical” aspects of presidential power, albeit at more modest rates than under 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. By initiating, or further enabling, growth trends in cabinet 
government, media influence, and institutional reform, he developed operational templates used by later 
Republican presidents, notably, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan. Rather than being dismissed as 
irrelevant, therefore, Harding’s tenure should be credited both for its innovation and flexibility at a time of 
institutional crisis and for its contribution to the development of post-1930s Republican presidential leadership.
A general consensus exists among historians and political scientists that a pro-
to-modern presidency emerged during the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt (TR; 
1901–1909) and Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921). Their active-interventionist styles tri-
alled a more personalized, institutionally powerful, and politically independent executive 
than the “dignified,” restrained, and party-dependent presidencies of the late nineteenth 
century. Roosevelt adapted the Jacksonian concept of the presidency as the “steward” of 
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the public interest, with its unique electoral mandate conferring upon it not only the 
ability but the duty to define and enunciate “national” values and goals. Wilson believed 
that the reforms needed for the government to tackle the growing socioeconomic inequal-
ity and complexity of the nation could be provided only by an executive branch capa-
ble of directing or bypassing the corrupted political system, which, in its decentralized, 
slow-moving operations, was ill suited to modern governance. This proto-modern model, 
it is generally believed, fell into abeyance after 1920, partly due to a sharp congressional 
reaction against executive power and partly to Wilson’s conservative Republican succes-
sors. Wilsonian “presidentialism” only became entrenched under Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(FDR), whose actions permanently shifted the Washington power balance in the execu-
tive’s favor.
The weakness of this interpretation has always been its oversimplification of the 
Wilson–FDR transition period from 1921 to 1933 (conventionally presented as a period 
of abdicated presidential power) and, particularly, the dismissal of the Warren Harding 
administration’s contribution to the survival and further development of the proto-mod-
ern presidency. Rash and severe errors of political judgment by TR and Wilson, straining 
both party unity and institutional stability, had provoked a backlash in Congress and both 
major parties. By 1920, pressure from conservatives was growing for a system correction, 
reasserting congressional control of policy making and restoring parties as the main artic-
ulators of voter interests. The political character of the victorious candidate in the 1920 
election was, therefore, unusually important. Taking office at a moment of uncertainty 
over the presidency’s future character and role, Harding’s actions, whether in restraining 
or expanding executive power, would substantially influence the depth and longevity of 
the anti-executive backlash. A passive “whig” leader, reflecting the distrust of executive 
power that characterized the old Whig Party, might be expected to abandon many of the 
TR–Wilson innovations, while an overtly “steward”-style presidency would struggle in a 
hostile political environment, possibly prolonging the congressional backlash. History’s 
conventional assessment is that Harding, a conservative senator critical of Wilson’s “ex-
cesses,” launched 12-year retardation of executive power, surrendering the political initia-
tive to Republican leaders in Congress and deliberately lowering the profile and prestige of 
his office. In fact, Harding’s reputation as “passive and uninterested in the details of gov-
ernment” is as flawed as the dismissal of his record as a failed exercise in political nostalgia 
(Genovese 2000, 122). This article contends that, far from being the “McKinley-esque” 
leader Republicans marketed in 1920, Harding proved to be a pragmatic modernizer who 
maintained key elements of the TR–Wilson “revolution” in presidential power and was 
receptive to intervention and reform in ways uncharacteristic either of past whig-style 
presidents or of his immediate conservative predecessors William McKinley and William 
Howard Taft. Far from being disengaged from the debate over executive power, Harding 
internalized the “‘whig” versus “steward” dilemma so completely that it consumed his 
short administration as he searched for a workable compromise between the two. His 
problems lay less in his reputed intellectual limitations than in the inability of a fractured 
Congress to unite behind his leadership and the failure of Republican leaders to heed his 
warnings that, as president, he would defend executive prerogatives as energetically as he 
had defended those of Congress. This failure of communication generated 28 months of 
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confrontation, as Harding prioritized his own agenda and the advice of his “Best Minds” 
cabinet over congressional opinion, pursued institutional reform, and exploited the grow-
ing power of the “rhetorical presidency” to manipulate public opinion. By consistently 
defending his office from the worst of the anti-executive backlash, while struggling to re-
balance interbranch relations, Harding should be identified as a forward-looking, if mod-
ified, steward president, not a regressive whig.
Political Context: The “Whig” Campaign of 1920
In his 1913 Autobiography, Theodore Roosevelt claimed a broad natural field for ex-
ecutive intervention, arguing it should only be restrained if “such action was forbidden by 
the Constitution or by the laws” (367). “I did not usurp power,” he contended, “but I did 
greatly broaden the use of executive power. … I acted for the common well-being of all our 
people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary” (Roosevelt 1921, 367). To TR, 
the presidency was the only political institution capable of defining the economic, politi-
cal, and moral choices confronting the nation and quickly converted the office “from a pas-
sive organization into a legislative clearing-house and proposal factory” (Whittington and 
Carpenter 2003, 501). He contrasted his “Lincoln–Jackson” (steward) leadership model 
with the “Buchanan–Taft” (whig) model, which took a “narrowly legalistic view that the 
President is the servant of Congress rather than of the people and can do nothing, no 
matter how necessary it is to act unless the Constitution explicitly commands the action” 
(Roosevelt 1921, 372–73). Woodrow Wilson’s Constitutional Government in the United States 
(1908) also saw the presidency as both definer and defender of the public interest. “Let him 
once win the admiration and confidence of the country,” he wrote, “and no other single 
force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him” (Calabresi 
and Yoo 2008, 254). Steward rhetoric particularly inspired progressives impatient to by-
pass the arcane, corrupt legislative process. Conservatives, however, believed stewardship 
replaced representative party government—the bedrock of political stability—with an 
incendiary mix of populism and executive i. Drawing upon the old Whig Party attacks on 
Andrew Jackson, they argued that Congress represented the people and should only cede 
power to the presidency during emergencies, such as civil war.
Senator Harding followed this precept in 1917–1918, accepting Wilson’s wartime 
centralization of economic and political power as an unpleasant necessity, but demanding 
its immediate reversal thereafter. Wilson’s refusal to involve Congress in peace negotia-
tions or to consider Senate Majority Leader Henry Cabot Lodge’s “reservations” to the 
Versailles Treaty, Harding believed, justified conservative suspicions of presidential 
power. He also thought the president’s flawed psychology made him prone to authoritar-
ianism and maliciously suggested to his campaign manager, Harry Daugherty, that 
Wilson’s debilitating stroke arose from “disappointment over anyone daring to question 
his authority.”1 Publicly, Harding argued that “the safety of popular government lies in 
1. Letter, Warren G. Harding (WGH) to Harry M. Daugherty (HMD). october 4, 1919. Harding 
Presidential Papers (HPP). Library of Congress. Washington, DC. Reel 28. Box 85.
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Congress’s asserting itself.”2 Wartime centralization had revealed “the narrowness of the 
line between autocracy and democracy. … I can assure you that there is to be a reassertion 
of the power of Congress now that the peril has passed.”3 In the 1920 election, however, 
Republicans blurred the lines between anti-authoritarianism and anti-Wilson spite. 
Lodge, in his opening speech to the Republican convention in Chicago, declared, “The 
chief magistrate must understand that it is his duty not only to enforce but to abide by 
… the laws made by the representatives of the people.”4 Comparing Wilson to French 
president-turned-emperor Louis napoleon, he railed, “Mr. Wilson stands for a theory of 
… government which is not American.”5
Unlike Lodge, however, Harding also disapproved of TR’s egotistical behavior. 
Wilson’s arrogance sapped his own party’s vitality and damaged constitutional checks and 
balances, but TR’s effort to unseat President Taft also split the GoP and harmed its rep-
resentative capacity. He vowed to reject the nomination unless Republicans promised to 
restore “party sponsorship which means perfect coordination between the Executive and 
the legislative branches.”6 His campaign focus on the risks of stewardship was not, there-
fore, purely opportunistic. He feared, with some justification, that stewardship was in-
herently disruptive as its power relied largely upon public discontent. He aligned himself 
with the traditional whig perspectives outlined by Taft in a series of lectures at Columbia 
University in the winter of 1915–1916. Taft’s strict constructionist view of the presi-
dency made him “something of a hero among libertarians” but antagonized progressives 
by restricting executive actions to those specifically mandated by the Constitution 
(Howell 2013, 102). Taft dismissed Roosevelt’s claims of an “undefined residuum of 
power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest” (Taft 
1916, 140). All branches of the federal government, Taft argued, should strive for stable 
working relationships, within the normal constraints of partisanship. The Constitution 
and parties provided all the conflict-resolution mechanisms the nation needed and pro-
tected against the “uneven” performance of steward presidents.
Harding echoed these views in his July 22 acceptance speech. “no man is big 
enough,” he declared, “to run this great Republic. There never has been one. Such domi-
nation was never intended. Let me be understood clearly from the very beginning … I 
believe in party government as distinguished from personal government.”7 This was not, 
as some perceived, a call for a weak executive but a plea for reasonable levels of interbranch 
cooperation. Progressives, most of whom classed Harding as a likable, nonoctrinaire 
 conservative, were still profoundly disappointed by his nomination. Many claimed that 
Republican “old Guard” conservatives were using Harding as their puppet in order to 
“neuter” the presidency. His advocacy of executive self-restraint fueled these rumors to 
such an extent that a worried Lodge publicly promised that the party would not dictate 
2. “What the new Republican Congress Intends to Do.” New York Times (May 18, 1919), 6.
3. “Congress to Grasp Reins, Says Harding.” New York Times (May 19, 1919), 5.
4. Address of the Temporary Chairman. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Seventeenth Republican 
National Convention (new York: The Tenny Press, 1920), 19.
5. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Republican National Convention, 17.
6. Letter, WGH to James Darden. August 8, 1919. HPP. Reel 28. Box 85.
7. “Republican Hopes outlined by Lodge.” New York Herald (July 23, 1920), 7.
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to its nominee. “It is to you that we look,” he told Harding in the notification ceremony, 
“to set forth the proper policies to be pursued by the Republican Party, both in the cam-
paign and when charged with the responsibility of administration.”8 Rumors of a Senate 
coup persisted, however, encouraged by Republicans’ relentless iconification of McKinley, 
whose administration seemed a golden age of political stability and executive dignity to 
older conservatives and offered a better whig role model than the defeated Taft. In 
Harding, the Indianapolis Star declared, Republicans had chosen a man who “looks like 
McKinley, acts like McKinley and thinks like McKinley.”9 Harry Daugherty encouraged 
the comparison, telling a nebraskan committee member that Harding was “very much 
like McKinley in size, temperament and tendencies.”10 Progressives’ fears grew as 
McKinley’s shadow lengthened over the 1920 election. The twenty-fifth president, they 
contended, had been an affable stooge of corporatism, Congress, and “Boss” Mark Hanna. 
The New Republic warned, “To understand what he is, we have to forget all that has hap-
pened since Theodore Roosevelt became President.”11
Conspiracy rumors and McKinley-worship fostered twin crises of identity and legit-
imacy for Harding before his administration had even begun. Democrats, progressives, 
and even some Republicans sought to exploit the doubts. Democrat nominee James Cox 
denounced the “domineering, arrogant oligarchy (which) seeks now to annex the presi-
dency.”12 Columnist Mark Sullivan believed Cox’s perspective was “shared, though from 
a different point of view … by several of Mr. Harding’s Republican fellow-Senators,” who 
sought a “whig” president to secure congressional control of both foreign and domestic 
policy (Sullivan 1922, 308). Pennsylvania Senator Boies Penrose proved Sullivan’s point 
in January 1921, telling reporters, “I don’t think the Senate will take a program from any 
Secretary of State” (Murray 1973, 522). In summer 1920, as Harding began mixing calls 
for executive restraint with assurances of his personal independence, his relations with 
party leaders began deteriorating. When former Attorney General Philander Knox criti-
cized his refusal to endorse or reject League of nations membership, Harding hit back, 
“You seem to think I am so utterly lacking in sticking qualities. Maybe someday you will 
come to know me better.”13 He privately disparaged the “old Guard,” noting, “Some are 
very mediocre and do not deserve the power which is accredited to them.”14 In october, 
Frederick Jackson Turner, meeting Lodge, Harding, and California Senator Hiram 
Johnson, found them “sticking spears in each other outrageously” (Billington 1970, 314). 
At a late october rally in Akron, ohio, Harding declared himself “unpledged, unowned 
and unbossed.”15 His most significant statement, however, came on December 5, in a 
8. Ibid.
9. “Harding Much Like M’Kinley as G.o.P. Type.” Indianapolis Star (June 13, 1920), 13.
10. Letter, Harry M. Daugherty to Harry S. Byrne. February 4, 1919. HPP. Reel 28. Box 85.
11. “Harding Much Like M’Kinley.” 
12. “Gov. Cox Hammers Senate oligarchy and Lauds League.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution (August 
22, 1920), 1A.
13. Letter, WGH to Philander Knox. September 25, 1920. Philander C. Knox Papers. Library of 
Congress. Vol. 23. June 24, 1920–november 4, 1921. Container 23.
14. Letter, WGH to C. A. Bigler. March 19, 1920. HPP. Reel 28. Box 86.
15. “‘Am Unpledged and Unbossed,’ Harding Says.” Chicago Daily Tribune (october 29, 1920), 3.
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farewell address to the Senate. He derided talk of a Senate “regency” as “a bit of highly 
imaginative and harmless fiction,” confirming his intention to respect the rights of 
Congress but “to be just as insistent about the responsibilities of the executive. … our 
governmental good fortune,” he observed, “does not lie in any surrender at either end of 
the Avenue” (Murray 1969, 94). It was his clearest public statement on conditionality in 
seeking interbranch consensus, but the warning came too late to correct the misunder-
standing between party and president-elect. Republicans, sneered the New Republic, antic-
ipated “the supreme opportunity to undo the work of Roosevelt and Wilson … they will 
have little mercy on Mr. Harding.”16 Party leaders had hardly bothered to anticipate the 
nature of the new executive–legislative relationship or to take seriously Harding’s at-
tempts to map boundaries. His signaling was too tentative and too late to counter expec-
tations that the new “whig” administration would be partisan, unambitious—and 
submissive. He would disappoint on all three.
Legislative–Executive Relations
Executive–legislative fissures emerged soon after the March 1921 inauguration. As 
the Republican Congress failed to heed Harding’s calls to convert the party platform into a 
coherent legislative timetable, the new president began referring more often to the changed 
institutional perspective first mentioned in his December Senate speech. He told Frank 
Brandegee he now held a “different position from that which I occupied as Senator. … I 
have been saying definite things to the American people and have been in a position to read 
their responses … as probably no one else in the country has been able to consider them.”17 
As early as May 1919, the New York Times had criticized the “lack of authoritative leader-
ship” in Congress, arguing for stability under either a single, dominant figure, a Thomas B. 
Reed or a Joseph Cannon, or under a leadership group.18 The 67th Congress possessed nei-
ther. Critical historians have blamed congressional disunity on Harding’s whiggish reluc-
tance “to use the powers of his office or his advantage in public opinion to bring reluctant 
congressmen into line” (Henry 1960, 270). This simplistic view that he could achieve mas-
tery simply by emulating TR or Wilson and cracking the executive whip reflects the broader 
failure to properly contextualize the Harding presidency. The 67th Congress was the most 
rebellious since Reconstruction. Factionalism, committee logjams, and filibusters under-
mined party unity. “Blocs” cooperated to kill unpopular bills, with coalitions forming and 
dissolving so quickly that party leaders struggled to control the legislative timetable. The 
anarchy quickly disillusioned Harding, who, from his “changed perspective,” denounced 
blocs as “a menace to the country.”19 Increasingly, he used a combination of rhetorical inter-
vention and backstairs pressure to push Congress into action and clashed with GoP leaders, 
particularly Lodge, over what he saw as the party’s parochialism and lack of discipline.
16. “Mr. Harding in Pain.” The New Republic (January 19, 1921), 213.
17. Letter, WGH to Frank Brandegee. December 20, 1920. HPP. Reel 227. Box 758.
18. “What the new Republican Congress Intends to Do.” New York Times (May 18, 1919), 1.
19. Letter, WGH to H.V. Jones. June 17, 1922. HPP. Reel 232. Box 770.
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In May 1921, Harding interpreted a declaration by Lodge that the Versailles Treaty 
could not be resubmitted in any form for ratification by Congress as implying the con-
gressional control of foreign policy. on May 4, the New York Times reported a contradic-
tion from the White House. Its “oral and informal” source, it assured readers, was not 
Secretary Hughes but could be “accepted as having the sanction of the President him-
self.”20 This obscure phrasing conventionally implied the president had spoken. Harding, 
who maintained an easygoing, gossipy relationship with reporters, probably gave tacit 
acquiescence for the “leak” during a post-Cabinet press conference. The Times reported it 
approvingly as “a pointed reminder to the Senate and the House that the foreign policies 
of the administration would be formulated at the White House” and a signal that “the 
President intends to follow his own course … and will resent any attempt on the Senate’s 
part to tell him what to do.”21
The administration also moved quickly when Idaho Senator Bill Borah called for a 
naval disarmament conference. Harding and Hughes were considering the idea before the 
inauguration but chose to wait until separate peace treaties with the defeated Central 
Powers had been concluded. When Borah’s amendment was passed, progressive econo-
mist Raymond Robins warned the president that Congress was “trying to force your 
hand.”22 Harding feigned disinterest, stating “it is not of particular concern to the 
Administration what form the expression of Congress shall take” but, behind the scenes, 
told Hughes to accelerate preparations for the talks, broadening the scope of discussions 
and involving more nations, in order to out-flank Borah.23 Although Harding was deemed 
“more skillful than Wilson” in minimizing isolationist opposition to the conference trea-
ties, he was stung by Hiram Johnson’s accusation that the administration had conducted 
“secret diplomacy” to secure them (Trani and Wilson 1977, 154). His response, during a 
February 10, 1922, Senate address recommending the treaties for ratification, framed this 
dispute once again in terms of executive–legislative boundaries. After praising senators’ 
“very proper jealousy” of their ratification power, he returned to his “changed institu-
tional perspective” theme. “To the Executive,” he claimed, “comes the closer view of 
world relationships and a more impressive realization of the menaces, the anxieties … to 
be met.”24 The Wilsonesque suggestion that senators should remember their place failed 
to stop Congress  from amending the Four-Power Treaty by inserting language, taken 
from Harding’s Senate speech, pledging that the treaty contained “no commitment to 
armed force, no alliance and no obligation to join in defense no expressed or implied com-
mitment to arrive at agreement except in accordance with your constitutional meth-
ods.”25 on February 18, the State Department cabled Hughes in Bermuda, warning that 
Johnson was now demanding the surrender of all executive records and memoranda from 
20. “Flat Denial Made of Treaty Reversal by Administration.” New York Times (May 4, 1921), 1.
21. Ibid.
22. Letter, Raymond Robins to WGH. May 14, 1921. HPP. Reel 229. Box 762.
23. Letter, WGH to Frank Mondell. June 25, 1921. HPP. Reel 229. Box 762.
24. “President’s Speech to the Senate Submitting Treaties.” New York Times (February 11, 1922), 2.
25. Comments and Reflections upon the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments and Far Eastern Questions. 
Speech delivered by former Under Secretary of State norman H. Davis to the Council on Foreign Relations. 
Hotel Astor, new York. February 17, 1922, 13–14. Source: Mark Sullivan Papers. Library of Congress. Box 4.
8 | PALMER
the conference. “The President,” it added, “is disposed to flatly deny request.”26 Hughes 
cabled back, “President’s attitude seems to me exactly right. The freedom of the executive 
in negotiating treaties should not be impaired by yielding to demands of this sort.”27 
Harding wrote angrily to Lodge, “I need not tell you that I think (Johnson’s demand) is 
utterly needless.”28 Having been involved in negotiations, he argued, Congress should 
ratify the treaties without amendment. He challenged Lodge to see the issue in constitu-
tional terms and “have the whole question thrashed out and reach a definite conclusion 
whether the Executive Branch of the government may venture to negotiate treaties.”29 
The conference’s aims, he argued, were not only constitutional but conservative. If even 
these were unattainable without an embarrassing fight, “we ought to know it and guard 
against future exhibition of the impotency of the Executive Branch.”30 He restated the 
point in December when Borah moved an amendment to a naval appropriations bill de-
manding the president call a conference on European economic conditions. In a response 
that Hughes rated “most excellent,” Harding informed Lodge: “on the face of it, it is 
equivalent to saying that the executive branch … which is charged with the conduct of 
foreign relations, is not fully alive to a world situation which is of deep concern to the 
United States.”31 Congress, he argued, should have consulted the State Department be-
fore publicly questioning his good faith, as his administration had always been willing to 
share confidential information “in a spirit of cooperation.”32
The president’s resentment at his party’s faithlessness matched his cynicism over 
their motivations. He privately dismissed Borah as “not sincere” and too concerned to 
“play the individual game of personal advancement.”33 “It is my strong conviction,” he 
told Judge David Pugh, “that the greatest difficulty in making government effective at 
the present time … is that so many men in public life give first consideration to … their 
own popularity.”34 When, in December 1921, he had confessed to close friend Malcolm 
Jennings, “I find I cannot carry my pre-election ideals of an Executive keeping himself 
aloof from Congress,” it was less a confession that his hopes for interbranch cooperation 
were misguided per se than a realization that Congress was incapable of meeting them.
During the summer of 1921, factionalism continued to block tax reform, as agrar-
ian states prioritized tariff revision and federal agricultural subsidies. Finally persuading 
rebels to reduce their demands to five bills, the first two of which Harding signed on 
August 24, the administration waited patiently for Lodge to move ahead on tax reform.35 
26. Cable, Henry P. Fletcher to Charles Evans Hughes, February 18, 1922. Library of Congress. 
Charles Evans Hughes Papers. Containers 5–7. Reel 4.
27. Draft cable, Charles Evans Hughes to Henry P. Fletcher, February 19, 1922. Library of Congress. 
Charles Evans Hughes Papers. Containers 5–7. Reel 4.
28. Letter, WGH to HCL. February 27, 1922. HPP. Reel 227. Box 756.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Letter, WGH to HCL. HPP. Reel 227. Box 756. Memorandum: Charles Evans Hughes to WGH. 
December 28, 1922. HPP. Reel 227. Box 756.
32. Ibid.
33. Letter, WGH to Colonel George B. Christian. January 1, 1923. HPP. Reel 249. Box 892.
34. Letter, WGH to Judge David Pugh. november 22, 1922. HPP. Reel 230. Box 653.
35. The Futures Trading Act and Emergency Agricultural Credits Act.
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Instead, rebels hijacked the timetable to prioritize another issue—cash compensation for 
wounded veterans. The Soldiers’ Adjusted Compensation bill mandated federal payments 
to all ex-servicemen at a potential cost to the Treasury of $5 billion. This, Andrew Mellon 
warned, would be “unfortunate in the extreme” for the administration’s fiscal strategy.36 
Harding took a hard line from the outset, offering a compromise designed for rejec-
tion—a new sales tax to fund the bonus—before losing patience altogether. on July 12, 
he appeared before the Senate to demand resolution of the deadlock, insisting, “the prob-
lem is immediately yours as your unfinished business.”37 Such a “menacing effort to ex-
pend billions in gratuities,” he continued, should be halted.38 Alabama Democrat Pat 
Harrison, recalling Harding’s campaign against personal leadership, suggested, “If the 
President has changed his mind about the wickedness of executive encroachments, he 
ought to make a public apology for his past utterances.”39 new Mexico’s Andrieus Jones 
saw a disturbing precedent in Harding’s entering Congress solely to attack, not recom-
mend, legislation, something even Wilson had not done.40 By breaking with convention 
and exploiting Roosevelt’s “residuum of power,” the president secured the recommittal of 
the bill. The dispute resurfaced in September 1922, when Lodge pressured Harding to 
accept a revised bonus bill, citing claims by veterans’ organizations that the president’s 
campaign promises mandated his support. Harding instructed Postmaster General Will 
Hays to review all his campaign speeches. “I’ll give you two days to have it looked up. … 
Put enough men on the job to read every word I ever uttered” (Stoddard 1927, 472). once 
sure of his ground, he tersely dismissed Lodge’s arguments and vetoed the bill. It was 
unacceptable, he wrote, for Congress to pass costly legislation “and then leave the 
Executive Branch … to struggle with the problem of carrying (it) out.”41 Efforts to over-
ride the veto failed by four votes in the Senate.
Though still holding the view that it was unwise “to encourage a scrap” with 
Congress “unless it is absolutely necessary in self-defense,” Harding responded aggres-
sively to perceived slights to his authority.42 His correspondence underlined his changed 
perspective and growing antipathy toward his party’s leaders. During the 1922 mid-
terms, Lodge faced a tough reelection battle in Massachusetts. In late September, he re-
quested an endorsement letter from the White House. Harding’s reply praised Lodge’s 
“splendid public services” but explained that endorsements, if made at all, would be de-
layed until mid-october, to avoid Wilson’s mistake of making the executive seem overly 
partisan.43 Lodge conceded the point but stressed, “it certainly ought to come out by that 
time if I am to have it.”44 A week later, he wrote again. Harding restated his position, 
36. Letter, Andrew W. Mellon to Joseph E. Frelinghuysen. July 2, 1921. HPP. Box 545. Folder 7.
37. “Defer Bonus Action, Speed Tax Revision, the President Urges.” New York Times (July 13, 
1921), 1.
38. Ibid.
39. “Why Harding Takes the Helm.” Literary Digest. Vol LXX no. 6 (August 6, 1921), 11.
40. “Delay on Bonus Is Considered to Be Assured.” Baltimore Sun (July 13, 1921), 1.
41. Letter, WGH to HCL (n.d.). HPP. Reel 230. Box 569.
42. Letter, WGH to W. E. Halley. January 22, 1920. HPP. Box 87.
43. Letter, WGH to HCL. September 27, 1922. HPP. Reel 227. Box 756.
44. Letter, HCL to WGH. September 29, 1922. HPP. Reel 227. Box 756.
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adding obliquely, “unless something develops to change my mind.”45 By october 11, he 
had publicly endorsed House Majority Leader Frank Mondell, but this, he told Lodge, 
provoked requests from countless Republican candidates across the country. “If I can per-
suade about a dozen applicants … that one addressed to you … covers the situation, I 
shall have no hesitancy in writing it.”46 Lodge swallowed another delay but urged, “a 
word of … support from you is very important to me just at this time.”47 Five days later, 
Harding confirmed that he had written Lodge’s endorsement but had decided not to re-
lease it, to avoid “the very great embarrassment” of denying letters to other candidates.48 
Lodge made no comment on Harding’s equation of his status with that of any ordinary 
Republican candidate. He replied, without irony, “nothing would persuade me to em-
barrass you in any way.”49 Harding never released his endorsement.
Cabinet Government and Institutional Reform
observing the development of the “institutional presidency” in the mid-twentieth 
century, E. E. Corwin highlighted cabinet consultation, hierarchical organization, and 
structured decision-making procedures as key strengths of the Dwight D. Eisenhower 
administration. Conservatives tended to favor more “managerial” approaches to executive 
leadership, in contrast to the loose administrative discipline of the FDR, Jimmy Carter, 
and Bill Clinton White Houses. This stemmed partly from the inherited whig emphasis 
on orderly, collegial decision making and partly from conservatives’ belief that increased 
issue complexity and bureaucratic enlargement made progressive/liberal “presidential-
ism” impractical. Harding’s repeated calls for bureaucratic streamlining, administrative 
efficiency, and the reinvigoration of cabinet government were early recognitions of these 
problems, but his perspectives and actions here suggest his presidency was more closely 
aligned, philosophically and organizationally, with the corporate conservatism of the 
Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan periods than with the era of McKinley and Taft.
By 1920, the Review of Reviews noted, many Americans had come to view the presi-
dent as “some sort of universal genius” who used cabinets “merely for the routine conduct 
of departmental work,” while others preferred collegiality and a president “surrounded by 
a Cabinet made up of men of great weight and authority.”50 Harding was temperamen-
tally inclined to the latter, telling Brandegee, “I am certainly too wise to play a lone hand 
in this big game.”51 Harding believed Wilson’s mistake was to create a cabinet so reliant 
upon his leadership that it could barely function during his illness. The remedy, he sug-
gested, was to adjust the president’s role to that of Cabinet “chairman”—less involved in 
45. Letter, WGH to HCL. october 6, 1922. HPP. Reel 227. Box 756.
46. Letter, WGH to HCL. october 11, 1922. HPP. Reel 227. Box 756.
47. Letter, HCL to WGH. october 17, 1922. Reel 227. Box 756.
48. Letter, WGH to HCL. october 22, 1922. Reel 227. Box 756.
49. Letter, HCL to WGH. october 25, 1922. Reel 227. Box 756.
50.   50. “Conceptions of the Presidency.” The American Review of Reviews. Vol. LXII. no. 1 (July 1920), 12.
51. Letter, WGH to Frank Brandegee. December 20, 1920. HPP. Reel 227. Box 758.
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defining and executing policies than in outlining broad goals, facilitating discussion, 
adjudicating disputes, and providing political advice and support in departments’ rela-
tions with Congress—an area the president considered his specialism. Cynics’ suggestions 
that Harding simply sought to compensate for his own ignorance were not entirely with-
out foundation, as Mark Sullivan hinted in speculating that Harding’s ideal chief execu-
tive was “a man who … adopts what is decided upon by the board of directors and always 
works with the sense of responsibility to them as the final source of power.”52 Abdication 
of presidential authority was not, however, what Harding had in mind. He did not share 
progressives’ expectations of an unbroken succession of intellectually and politically as-
tute presidents and preferred to encourage government-wide structural reform, expand-
ing federal authority in some areas, reducing it in others, while increasing the input from 
nonpartisan experts in policy making. Atop this structure would sit a cabinet of “best 
minds,” supportive of the president and dedicated to a policy program based upon, 
though not necessarily slavishly loyal to, the party platform. Ironically, Harding’s aspira-
tions echoed Wilson’s pre-1913 writings, which, as Robert Eden points out, advocated 
releasing presidents from mundane executive tasks to focus their energies on shaping 
public opinion and building support coalitions. Thus, Wilson argued, “the President may 
be said to administer the presidency in conjunction with the members of his cabinet like 
the chairman of a commission. He is even … much less active in the actual carrying out of 
the law than are his colleagues and advisors” (Eden 1996, 366, author’s italics). Although 
Wilson’s personality and wartime centralization sidetracked this idea, Harding revived it 
as a response to the crisis of executive power Wilson himself engineered. In some ways, 
Harding was more likely to succeed where Wilson failed. Unlike many of his conservative 
contemporaries, he shared progressives’ admiration for “experts,” even politically disin-
terested ones, who would improve the quality and coherence of policy making.53 Also, 
unlike many former congressional colleagues, he did not oppose presidentialism per se. 
Despite his campaign rhetoric, he acknowledged the impossibility of restoring Gilded 
Age institutional boundaries and somewhat admired the bold activism of Roosevelt and 
Wilson. They had erred, he believed, by arrogantly disregarding systemic checks and 
balances and fostering party and institutional crises that left the presidency vulnerable to 
counterattack by Congress. His hope, therefore, was twofold: first, to restore political 
stability and blunt the edge of the congressional backlash by encouraging interbranch 
cooperation and, second, to protect presidential prestige, while facilitating the continued, 
carefully measured, growth of executive authority. Inevitably, the pursuit of the first goal 
often threatened the success of the second, but it is still remarkable that Harding, given 
his poor historical reputation, made such an effort at all. His perspective on cabinet gov-
ernment differed from Wilson’s chiefly on the role of departmental heads. Eden, describ-
ing Wilson’s approach, explains, “The executive functions of government … can therefore 
be delegated to energetic lackeys or messenger-boys” (Eden 1996, 370). In Harding’s 
case, however, the keyword was “energetic” rather than “lackeys.” Aside from some inev-
itable partisan appointments—John Weeks and Edwin Denby to the War and navy 
52. “Senate Control of White House.” The Atlanta Constitution (June 27, 1920), 5.
53. “Harding’s Fad Is for Teamwork at Washington.” Chicago Daily Tribune (July 8, 1920), 5.
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departments, Albert Fall at Interior—and the unwise gift of the Justice Department to 
his close friend Daugherty—he sought activists with direct or related expertise in their 
allotted government roles. His choices revealed a steward’s inclination for activism, even 
if his rhetoric was consensual and his policies conservative.54 The Cabinet was built 
around a core group—Charles Evans Hughes at the State Department, Andrew Mellon as 
treasury secretary, Henry Wallace at Agriculture, Herbert Hoover at Commerce, and 
Charles Dawes as director of the Bureau of the Budget—which lent his administration a 
striking aura of talent and purpose, but of only weak partisanship. He expected protests 
over his appointments but dismissed out-of-hand Daugherty’s warnings of party discon-
tent, commenting, “The opposition of a number of the men mentioned in your letter does 
not very deeply impress me.”55 He also upbraided Brandegee for the “semblance of panic 
and lack of confidence” among congressional Republicans.56 In office, he sided mostly 
with his Cabinet in disputes with Congress, while Daugherty, the chief promoter of the 
1920 “McKinley–Harding” comparison, became isolated from decision making. Had 
Harding been a true whig, his appointments would have been strongly partisan and met 
with conservative approval in Congress. Instead, the Cabinet selection process of 1920–
1921 was one of the most contentious ever endured by an incoming president. Harding’s 
Cabinet seemed intentionally designed—even before the extent of Republican disunity 
became apparent—to insulate the presidency from congressional pressure and enable it to 
chart its own course. Journalists speculated, correctly, that Hughes—a moderate interna-
tionalist with formidable legal and political experience—was chosen in order to counter 
isolationist influence on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations because “it would be 
a wholesome thing if the domination exercised by that body were curbed.”57 Hughes 
proved a staunch advocate of executive foreign policy prerogatives and an administrative 
reformer, reorganizing the State Department to create new regional divisions that “greatly 
enhanced its capacity to deal with foreign affairs on a global scale” (Pusey 1951, 418). 
Mellon, a Pittsburgh millionaire with no experience of political office and little interest 
in partisan politics, was chosen as a strong proponent of debt and tax reduction capable of 
resisting congressional raids on government funds. Henry Wallace’s calls for federal solu-
tions to agricultural problems and his entrenched “prejudice against capital” disturbed 
conservatives, as did the “big government” impulses of Herbert Hoover (Winters 1967, 
115). Formerly Wilson’s wartime relief organizer, Hoover was a political neophyte dis-
trusted by party regulars. He advocated a new, cooperative relationship between govern-
ment and business, reducing the need for overarching government control but also 
increasing government activity in the economic sphere and regulating predatory behavior 
among businesses. With Harding’s express endorsement, national planning of commerce 
and industry became an administration priority, with 17 new departmental divisions 
contributing to the extension of government influence in trade and commerce during the 
54. “Harding Confirms Hoover Selection for Cabinet Place.” Washington Evening Star (February 25, 
1921), 1.
55. Letter, WGH to Harry Daugherty. February 9, 1921. HPP. Reel 227. Box 758.
56. Letter, WGH to Frank Brandegee. December 20, 1920.
57. “President Harding’s Cabinet.” Fortnightly Review. Vol. 115. Part 1. (April 21, 1921), 533.
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1920s. Harding, delighted with Hoover’s innovative and expansive strategies and uncon-
cerned at the spread of Commerce Department influence into more and more areas of the 
nation’s economic life, famously referred to his commerce secretary as “the smartest gink 
I know” (Palmer 2006, 31). In the unreconstructed whig administration of Calvin 
Coolidge, Hoover was mistrusted as the “wonder boy” (Palmer 2013, 182). Coolidge 
shared the fear of older conservatives that Hoover’s rise heralded a future in which “gov-
ernment no longer belongs so much to the governed as to the governors.”58
Harding thus aimed to mobilize administrative energy and policy expertise to the 
executive’s advantage, reducing the need for presidential interventions in daily govern-
ment business and freeing him to focus on the political and promotional aspects of leader-
ship he felt more qualified to handle. In this way, he accelerated trends that rendered the 
president “more and more a political and less and less an executive officer” (Eden 1996, 
367). Accepting that Wilson’s theory of an “elevated” presidency, implemented through 
the Best Minds project, was similar to Harding’s concept of presidential leadership, it 
becomes clear that he intended to use his rhetorical and political abilities—the skill set 
of Wilson’s liberated chief executive—to offset his sometimes erratic grasp of policy de-
tail. This approach was later adopted by both Eisenhower and Reagan. Unlike Wilson, 
however, Harding maintained his whiggish rhetoric while presiding over a core team 
of departmental “stewards,” thus moving the presidency away from dependence upon 
one personality without weakening either its policy-making capability or its recently 
acquired status as articulator of the national interest.
The Best Minds project ran parallel with Harding’s broader aims for government 
“rationalization,” which sought better administrative coordination and cost efficiency. 
His message to the Academy of Political Science in 1921, declaring, “the fact that a thing 
has existed for a decade or a century must not be accepted as proving that it ought to 
continue that way” indicates a difference between his reform-minded conservatism and 
traditionalists like McKinley, Taft, or Coolidge (Harding 1921, 102). Taft had flirted 
with budget reform in 1910, on the grounds that the executive was a better calculator of 
appropriations than Congress, but otherwise mistrusted the inexorable growth of govern-
ment. Harding was more sanguine and willing to use the presidency to promote a wave 
of organizational reform involving plans for new government departments, a reformed 
vice presidency, and an overhaul of the executive branch itself. His first address to 
Congress, on April 12, 1921, cited poor coordination and waste as reasons to centralize 
the Federal Board for Vocational Training, the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, and other 
agencies into one large veterans’ bureau. He also supported the creation of a Department 
of Public Welfare to focus federal influence on social policy. In 1922, he recommended 
appropriations of $1,240,000.00 for federal “promotion of the welfare and hygiene of 
maternity and infancy” after passage of the Sheppard–Towner Act.59 Harding also sup-
ported extending federal regulation of the infant radio and aircraft industries. As Hawley 
58. Ray T. Tucker, “Is Hoover Human?” North American Review. Vol. 226. no. 5 (november 1928), 
515.
59. Expenditure recommendation to Congress. HPP. Reel 193. Box 609. Harding supported the 
landmark 1921 Sheppard–Towner Act, despite the American Medical Association’s view of it as 
“socialistic.”
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notes, Harding gave Commerce to Hoover on the understanding not only that Hoover 
would revolutionize its structure and expand its reach into agricultural, labor, financial, 
and foreign affairs, but also that the president would guarantee to support Hoover’s inno-
vations against congressional attack (Hawley 1974, 118–19). His outlook was, therefore, 
considerably more active interventionist than that of any post-1865 Republican adminis-
tration, save Roosevelt’s. Government power under Harding, Walter Dodd noted in 
March 1923, continued to increase “step by step with the enormous increase in the trans-
actions to be controlled” (Dodd 1923, 452–53).
The president also took a personal interest in the Joint Committee on the 
Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government—created in 1920 to improve 
departmental coordination and congressional oversight powers. In an unprecedented ex-
ecutive intervention, Harding placed his personal representative, Walter F. Brown, on 
the committee and sought to make him chairman, backing off only when GoP Senator 
Reed Smoot warned that congressional hostility to a perceived executive takeover might 
sink the project. Brown eventually took the chair and, encouraged by Harding, hijacked 
the reorganization process, freezing out congressional committee members and develop-
ing his own reform proposals. on January 22, 1922, Harding secured his goal of an ex-
ecutive-centric report recommending reforms, which, Peri Arnold notes, “would lead to 
an executive branch more amenable to management from above” (1981, 589). Among 
other innovations, the new Budget Bureau would escape Treasury direction and come 
under direct presidential control (something Wilson had sought); a Department of 
national Defense would absorb the War and navy departments; and a Department of 
Education and Public Welfare would increase federal intervention in social policy.60 
Brown worked partly with Dawes and Hoover in developing the plan, which, he later 
explained, would not only relieve the president of intolerable administrative burdens 
accrued as government transformed into a “colossal machine” from the late nineteenth 
century, but also counter Congress’s anarchic tendency to “create independent executive 
establishments reporting directly to the president rather than bureaus under depart-
ments attached to a cabinet official.”61 Brown’s secretive approach, however, drew pre-
dictable congressional complaints of a lack of consultation and some opposition from 
within Harding’s Cabinet.62 Although Congress refused to consider the proposals, 
Brown’s ideas partly underpinned the later landmark reorganization recommended by 
the Brownlow commission in 1937.
Centralizing budgeting responsibilities in the executive would, over the long term, 
profoundly affect the balance of power between Congress and the White House. As Irene 
Rubin notes, one of the key drivers for budgeting reform had been the need for greater 
efficacy in regulating procedures (1993, 441). Because legislation creating the bureau was 
passed under Wilson, Harding could only be “a follower, not a leader” in this field, but 
he understood its potential impact on the executive–legislative power balance in strength-
ening executive control over fiscal policy, while cutting government jobs, thus reducing 
60. “Reorganisation Plans in President’s Hands.” Baltimore Sun (January 22, 1922), 30.
61. “Four Assistants to Presidents Urged.” New York Times (September 2, 1923), 132.
62. “Reports to Harding on Reorganization.” New York Times (January 22, 1922), 20.
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scope for party patronage (Murray 1969, 173). Rather than blunting the impact of the 
reform or proceeding with caution to avoid offending Congress, Harding tapped the hy-
peractive Charles Dawes to run the bureau and supported a program of radical cuts, over 
protests from congressional committees which, until then, had set annual appropriations. 
Congress feared total executive control of federal finances through enhanced data gather-
ing, resource distribution, and communication techniques. Dawes demanded that all de-
partment heads submit expenditure estimates, publicly rebuking them for failing to meet 
bureau targets or for requesting supplemental appropriations. The president’s determina-
tion to make deep budget cuts overrode even Hoover’s private warning that “wise expen-
diture by the Government is not only more fruitful but critically necessary.”63 The 
president answered blandly, “I know full well that … it is a false economy to pinch the 
funds available for needed service” but made no move to restrain Dawes.64 Harding shared 
Henry Stimson’s cynical view of Congress as “an aggregation of log-rolling units.”65 
“Whenever the government makes a showing of reduced expense,” the president com-
plained, “somebody in Congress conceives that the money saved ought to be expended.”66 
The budget strategy provided a long-term stimulant to presidential power. The Harding 
administration executed one of the century’s sharpest fiscal policy reversals, reducing 
government expenditure from $5,538,000,000 to $3,697,000,000 over three years 
(Sullivan 1935, 209). Dawes undercut existing appropriations so deeply that Congress, 
having once attacked Wilson’s “profligacy,” now struggled to justify its own estimates. 
The presidency increasingly held the whip hand in fiscal policy. Moreover, the manner in 
which Harding wielded this new authority leaned sharply in the direction of stewardship, 
emphasizing “a Progressive sensibility of managerial efficiency” even as it bit deeply into 
the budget (Whittington and Carpenter 2003, 506). It also served to emphasize the dis-
tance Harding was deliberately placing between his administration’s goals and congres-
sional partisanship. He seemed prepared, Murray observes, to “crucify his party on the 
cross of fiscal integrity if necessary” (Murray 1969, 73). As Don Price notes, war and 
personal ambition stimulated “positive executive leadership” under Lincoln and Wilson, 
but the administrative support needed to convert these temporary advances into perma-
nent institutional superiority was lacking (1958, 167). The success of the Harding ad-
ministration’s budget strategy strengthened executive influence over fiscal policy for the 
next half-century (Hager and Sullivan 1994, 1083).
Harding’s interest in institutional reform extended to the vice presidency. Since the 
1830s, party conventions had chosen vice presidential nominees and few presidents had 
working relationships with their deputies. Wilson’s tutelage of Thomas Marshall was so 
inadequate that Marshall feared himself unqualified to be president should Wilson die. 
Harding considered this an absurd and potentially dangerous situation and included the 
vice presidency in his pledge to ensure government decisions “rest upon the broad base of 
more than one intelligence” (Anonymous 1921, 21). The vice president, he told reporters 
63. Letter, Herbert Hoover to WGH. May 6, 1921. HPP. Reel 229. Box 761.
64. Letter, WGH to Herbert Hoover. May 12, 1921. HPP. Reel 229. Box 761.
65. Letter, Henry L. Stimson to WGH. February 10, 1923. HPP. Reel 232. Box 771.
66. Letter, WGH to Walt Mason. February 10, 1922. HPP. Reel 232. Box 70.
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at a June 1920 press conference, should be “more than a mere substitute in waiting … 
[he] … can and ought to play a big part” (McCoy 1967, 123). Tellingly, his preference for 
the post was Wisconsin’s progressive senator, Irvine Lenroot, whose temperament and 11 
years of experience in national politics suited Harding’s own inclination toward a proac-
tive executive working closely with Congress. Unfortunately, convention delegates chose 
Calvin Coolidge, an old-fashioned whig possessing neither national experience nor re-
forming instincts. nevertheless, Harding hoped to integrate Coolidge into the Best 
Minds project, declaring his intention to build “a Cabinet of highest capacity … in whose 
councils, the Vice President … shall be asked to participate.”67 He dismissed warnings 
that vice presidents, as presiding officers in the Senate, should not be too closely involved 
in policy making. “I confess I smile at all of you who take a fling at this proposition,” he 
wrote Brandegee. “I do not believe it will hurt … matters to have the Vice President ex-
press his views. He is the second official of the Republic. It may prove to be a miserable 
failure. If it is so, no great harm has been done.”68 Harding envisaged the vice president 
as a useful tool for smoothing relations between executive and legislature. He may also 
have considered giving his deputy more administrative responsibilities—a change initi-
ated more than 30 years later by Eisenhower. Unfortunately, Coolidge showed no interest 
in expanding his role and rarely contributed to Cabinet discussions, despite Harding’s 
encouragement (Pusey 1951, 426). The two men never developed a close personal or po-
litical relationship, and Harding eventually dropped the idea.
By late 1922, Congress was drifting and the GoP disunited but Harding remained 
popular and respected for having, as William Jennings Bryan commented, “surpassed all 
expectations.”69 on March 4, 1922, the New York Times concurred, “It would be unjust to 
fail to note … that one of the achievements of President Harding’s administration has been 
Mr. Harding himself.”70 Eight months earlier, the Literary Digest had suggested Harding’s 
“theoretical abhorrence of executive interference and one-man power” meant his bouts of 
assertiveness were “thrust upon him in spite of his temperament.”71 This was not entirely 
true. Harding enjoyed wielding the rhetorical power of the presidency to appeal to public 
opinion and influence debate and made it a consistent feature of his leadership. Mark 
Sullivan perhaps came closer to the mark in suggesting that Harding had deliberately 
lowered public expectations in 1920 in order to outperform them, thus maximizing public 
and press good will, from which the presidency could draw political energy.
The decision to deliver his first message to Congress in person had been deliberately 
symbolic. James Ceaser identified Wilson’s use of oratory “to create an active public opin-
ion” as the fundamental change that distinguished the new stewardship presidency from 
the old whig model (Ceaser et al. 1981, 162). For a whig president determined to erase 
outward manifestations of steward leadership, reviving the pre-Wilson tradition of 
67. “Warren G. Harding. Address Accepting the Republican Presidential nomination.”
http://www.presi dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76198.
68. Letter, WGH to Frank Brandegee. December 20, 1920.
69. Letter, William Jennings Bryan to WGH. november 14, 1921. HPP. Reel 227. Box 758.
70. “one Year of Harding.” New York Times (March 4, 1922) 10.
71. Literary Digest, “Why Harding Takes the Helm,” 12.
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having presidential messages read out by clerks would have been an obvious gesture. 
Harding, however, preferred the stewardship style and made regular appearances, both 
scheduled and unexpected, before Congress. In September 1921, he lectured a segregated 
audience in Birmingham, Alabama, on the importance of equal political and legal rights 
for black citizens. Jabbing his finger toward the audience’s white section, he declared, 
“Unless our democracy is a lie, you must stand for that equality.”72 The speech provoked 
anger in southern newspapers but was praised by black political leaders as the strongest 
presidential speech on civil rights since Reconstruction. This unexpected declaration was 
partly designed to pacify black leaders’ demands that the president publicly support pas-
sage of the Dyer anti-lynching bill, which was threatened in Congress by a southern fili-
buster. Harding also hoped to undermine the Democrats’ electoral grip on the south. The 
fact that he took no further action indicated the pragmatic, if sometimes uncourageous, 
limits to his use of rhetorical interventions. Having deliberately stirred a hornets’ nest, he 
bowed to the filibuster in order to salvage his legislative timetable. Three months later, 
he ordered the release of most antiwar activists jailed under Wilson, including former 
socialist presidential candidate Eugene Debs, over protests from Congress members. The 
clemency gesture at Christmas attracted widespread press attention, contrasting Harding’s 
generosity of spirit favorably with that of his congressional critics. Here, as with the 
Birmingham and bonus speeches, Harding used steward-style “gesture politics” to focus 
press attention on the presidency. Georgia Democrat Tom Watson suspected this in his 
reference to the bonus intervention as “a dramatic performance,” adding, in words remi-
niscent of Lodge in 1920, “that kind of personal rule is absolutely antagonistic to our 
form of government.”73 The New York Times, however, applauded Harding’s assertiveness, 
comparing his sudden change in dress from white summer flannels to dark gray suit, 
hours before the bonus speech, to illustrate his ability to change swiftly from consensual 
politician to stern leader. “President Harding is a lightning change artist,” it noted ap-
provingly. “He gave an instance today of how quickly he is able to doff one suit of clothes 
and don another.”74
During Harding’s administration, particularly in its second half, executive inter-
ventions and clashes with Congress reached almost Wilsonian levels, with the president, 
in H. L. Mencken’s words, “rocking his own boat so violently that many of his most 
faithful partisans were coming down with mal-de-mer” (1984, 69). In 1922, he criticized 
Congress again, in an angry speech demanding passage of an administration priority—a 
shipping subsidies bill that had been stalled for months. He also used a State of the Union 
address to advocate a constitutional amendment banning child labor. This response to 
continued pressure to act after the Supreme Court’s 1918 rejection of the Keating–owen 
Act seemed to echo progressive views that unpopular judicial decisions could be over-
ruled by popular sentiment, stirred by the president. Though progressives argued 
72. “Harding Says negro Must Have Equality in Political Life.” New York Times (october 27, 
1921), 1.
73. Congressional Record–Senate (Washington, DC: Government Printing office, 1922). July 13, 
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pursuing a constitutional amendment was akin to kicking the issue into the long grass, 
Harding’s approach was similar to that taken over the Dyer anti-lynching bill. Facing 
intractable obstacles, such as a southern filibuster or a Supreme Court ruling, he chose not 
to ignore the issues but to use the “bully pulpit” to galvanize reform efforts. “We ought 
to amend to meet the demands of the people,” he declared, “when sanctioned by deliber-
ate public opinion.”75
The president also shared Wilson’s habit of publicizing not only himself but also 
federal government activities. He actively encouraged and appeared at stage-managed 
events, such as an unemployment conference in Washington hosted by Herbert Hoover. 
on his orders, the 1921 disarmament conference was thrown open to journalists, ensur-
ing that saturation coverage of his opening address pushed isolationist criticisms off the 
front pages. He also collaborated with Dawes on a very public launch for the new Budget 
Bureau in the Interior Department’s auditorium on June 29, 1921. With the full Cabinet 
seated behind him on the platform, Harding sternly noted that “no efficiency and no 
economy are ever to be thought of in public expense,” adding, “We want to reverse 
things” (Sullivan 1935, 209). Dawes announced the administration’s goal of a 25% cut in 
expenditure across all departments, warning Cabinet members, “I have the powers of the 
president to get the facts.”76 He then led six hundred bureau chiefs and deputies in a bi-
zarre “pledge of allegiance” to Harding and fiscal rectitude. This theatricality amused 
reporters but also magnified the event’s media impact, underscoring both the power of 
the executive and Harding’s personal authority.
The development of organized public relations as an adjunct of presidential power 
thus accelerated. In this, as in his statements on the constitutional prerogatives of the 
executive and references to his “unique” perspective as president, Harding consistently 
performed as a steward, rather than a whig. History accords him little recognition for his 
unconventional approach to media relations. The tradition of regular, twice-weekly press 
conferences began with Harding and differed radically from Wilson’s formalized, scripted 
style. Meetings were peppered with banter, gossip, and off-the-record comments, which 
reporters found helpful in pursuing stories. Frederick Essary, of the Baltimore Sun, re-
called, “This cross-fire between the head of our government and representatives of the 
press was a matter of … some astonishment to foreign newspaper men” (1928, 905). 
Harding’s off-the-cuff interplay with journalists boldly removed many of the barriers of 
etiquette and tradition between president and press that TR and Wilson had carefully 
preserved. FDR made the relaxation permanent, but it was Harding who pioneered it. A 
gaffe in interpreting the disarmament conference treaties made Harding more circum-
spect, but he continued to “exhibit” the presidency more frequently than any of his pre-
decessors, posing for photographers outside the White House with film actors, sporting 
legends, and visiting schoolchildren. In october 1922, he became the first president to 
receive an entire college football team.77 Requests for presidential radio messages were, 
75. Warren G. Harding, “Second Annual Message,” December 8, 1922. online by Gerhard Peters 
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however, discouraged by the president’s staff since, as Secretary George Christian recalled, 
“he would have been engaged practically all the time making radio speeches, from lunch-
time in Maine to the banquet hour at Los Angeles.”78 In spring 1921, Harding invited 
William Crawford, of The World’s Work, to spend a day shadowing the president as he 
conducted business in the White House—pioneering a “behind-the-scenes” technique 
usually credited by historians to Eisenhower’s “open” Cabinet meeting in December 
1953. Predictably, Crawford repaid this unprecedented access with a glowing account of 
Harding’s modesty, heavy work routine, and simple humanity in cussing under his breath 
at a bad golf stroke. Though some complained that Harding’s accessibility demeaned the 
office, columnist Frank Lowry thought it “effective publicity and quite legitimate.”79 By 
1926, Harding’s advancement of the “rhetorical presidency,” as much as Roosevelt’s or 
Wilson’s, prompted political scientist Lindsay Rogers to warn that media manipulation 
threatened to tilt the political power balance permanently in favor of the presidency 
(Ponder 1999, 123).
Conclusion
As Crockett observes, the tools and options available to presidents rest upon “a 
foundation of larger forces already in place” when they take office (2000, 246). Assuming 
office in 1921, at a time of postwar economic and political disorientation, Harding con-
fronted “larger forces,” which were rewriting political, economic, and societal rules at 
breakneck speed—a nationalized news media, a surging capitalist economy, and exponen-
tial growth in the size and power of the executive as the government struggled to meet 
complex socioeconomic challenges. The tools to meet these challenges, however, had been 
badly damaged, and options for executive action were unusually limited. Part of the 
blame for the resultant interbranch friction lay with Harding himself. Although he pre-
ferred party government to presidential dominance, he refused to surrender those ele-
ments of the proto-modern presidency, developed under TR and Wilson, which he 
considered necessary tools for governance. The general assumption that Harding was an 
old-style whig, reluctant to use executive power and wedded to outdated political as-
sumptions, is not supported by the evidence. More frequently than his Republican suc-
cessors, Coolidge and Hoover, he asserted executive prerogatives and supported reforms, 
including those broadening executive power. Cabinet government, the search for admin-
istrative cohesion, and the effort to control economic policy and coordinate department 
messaging on spending and debt as part of an ideologically cohesive fiscal program her-
alded an activist, business-oriented conservatism that served as a short-lived prototype for 
the later Eisenhower and Reagan presidencies.80 The informality of Harding’s press rela-
78. Letter, George Christian to Walter Williams. (n.d.). HPP. Reel 229, Box 762.
79. Edward G. Lowry, “Mr. Harding Digging In.” The New Republic (May 18, 1921), 341.
80. In the 1980s, with Harding’s name tarnished by scandal, Reagan publicly associated himself 
with Coolidge. Politically, however, there was little resemblance between them. Harding’s administration 
was the true political antecedent to the Reagan era.
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tions, which neither TR nor Wilson permitted, presaged their permanent relaxation 
under FDR. Further, unlike Taft, Coolidge, or Hoover, Harding fully exploited opportu-
nities to keep the presidency at the forefront of public debates, manipulate press head-
lines, and maintain his popularity by distancing his administration from congressional 
foot-dragging. He sincerely “meant all that I have said about restoring (interbranch) co-
ordination,” but, encountering congressional opposition, he instinctively appealed di-
rectly to the “surging, diverse and increasingly interconnected” electorate, thus increasing 
pressure on Congress81 (Greenberg 2011, 25). Harding’s language, particularly toward 
Congress, exemplified his unexpectedly firm defense of constitutional boundaries. 
Provocative use of phrases such as “your unfinished business,” attacks on spendthrift com-
mittees and the “menace” of blocs, the consistent framing of clashes with Congress as 
impermissible challenges to presidential authority, and his often brusque dismissal of 
criticism all indicate Harding’s determination to counter any effort to diminish the pres-
idency. This defiance was not applied uniformly, nor was it always successful, but, be-
tween March 1921 and August 1923, executive assertiveness existed at levels reminiscent 
of the Wilson era and not seen again until the arrival of Franklin Roosevelt. For that, the 
presidency of Warren G. Harding deserves some credit.
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